tional models that include these factors predict that the climate will warm significantly over the next century.
These forecasts of likely climate changes have forced a realization that it is necessary to reduce human-caused emissions of greenhouse gases. But hecause of the potential social disruntions and hieh economic costs of climate changes and whether they will actually lead to serious irnnacts. A key element of these spirited-and often acrimonious-debates is the credihility (or lack thereof) of the mathematically and physically hased climate models (4) that are used to project the climate changes resulting from a sustained buildup of atmospheric CO?. Some skeptics ask, to put it hluntly, why should we believe such models' attempts to describe changes in such a dauntingly complex system as Earth's climate? The cheap answer is that there are no credible alternatives. But the real answer is that the climate models do a reasonably good joh of capturing the essence of the large-scale asnects of the current climate and its considerahle natural variability on time scales ranging from 1day to decades (4).In spite of these considerable successes, the models contain weaknesses that add imnortant uncertainty to the ver\ beat model prolectlons of humannducedcl~mate changes I express here a "policy-independent" evaluation of the levels of current scientific confidence in predictions emanating frorn climate models. This climate model uncertainty is distinct from the high social uncertainty associated with future scenarios of greenhouse gas and airborne particle con-
The author is at the Geophysical Fluid Dynamcs Laboratory, National Oceanic and Atmosphere Admnistraton, Prnceton Universty, Prnceton. NJ 08542. USA E-mail.jrn@gfd gov centrations. I assume that detailed future greenhouse and airborne particle scenarios are part of the policy question and thus do not discuss them further. A fair-minded and exha~lstiveattempt to find a hroad consensus o n what science can say about this problem is contained in the most recent 1996 IPCC Working Group I Assessment (3). Some of my evaluations differ in detail frorn those of IPCC 1996, mostlv hecause of the addition of new research insights and information since 1994. A good guideline for e\.aluating contrary "expert" opinions is whether they use the IPCC science as a point of departure for their own analysis. In effect, if we disagree scientifically with IPCC, we should explain why. Without such discipline, contrary arguments are not likely to he scientifically sound.
Virtually Certain LIFacts"
These key aspects of our knowledge of the climate system do not depend directly on the skill of climate model sim~llationsand projections:
Atmospheric ahundances of greenhouse gases are increasing because of human activities.
Greenhouse gases absorh and re-radiate infrared radiation efficiently. This property acts directly to heat the planet.
Altered amounts of greenhouse gases affect the climate for many centuries. The major greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere for periods ranging from a decade to centuries. Also, the climate itself has considerable inertia, mainly because of the high heat capacity of the world ocean.
L ,
Changes in other radiatix~elyactive suhstances offset somewhat the warmine effect -of increased greenhouse gases. Observed decreases in lower stratosnheric ozone and increases in sulfate particles both produce cooling effects. The cooling effect of sulfate particles remains ins~~fficiently quantified.
Human-caused CO, increases and ozone decreases in the stratosphere have already produced more than a 1°C global ax7erage cooling there. This stratospheric cooling is generally consistent with model predictions.
Over the past century, Earth's surface has warmed hy about O.j°C (k0.2'C).
The natural variability of climate adds confusion to the effort to diagnose humaninduced climate changes. Apparent longterm trend5 can he artlflclally a m~l~f l e d or , L damped hy the contaminating effects of undiagnosed natural variatiiij~s. Significant reduction of key uncertainties will require adecade or more. The uncertainties concerning the responses of clouds, 'water vapor, ice, ocean currents, and specific regions to increased greenhouse gases remain formidable.
I further illustrate these climate uncertainties using two extrapolations of the IPCC idealized scenarios of increases of 1% equix~alent atmospheric C 0 2concentration per year (5).The first case le\~els off at a C 0 2 doubling after 70 years; the second levels off at a COzquadr~lplingafter 140 years. Both correspond to simple extrapolations of current trends in greenhouse gas emissions. Considering the long residence time of CO, at such large concentrations, these leveled-off scenarios are physically plausihle hut are nresented as illustrations, not as social predictions.
Virtually Certain Projections
These projections have a greater than 99 out of 100 chance of heing true within the predicted range (6):
The stratosphere will continue to cool significantly as COzincreases. If ozone continues to decrease, the cooling will be magnified. There is no kno\vn mechanism to prevent the glohal mean cooling of the stratosphere under these scenarios.
Global mean amounts of water vapor will increase in the lower troposphere (6to 3 km) in approximately exponential proportion (roughly 6% per 1" C of warming)
to the global mean temperature change.
T h e typical relative humidities would probably change substantially less, in percentage terms, than would water vapor concentrations.
Very Probable Projections
These projections have a greater than 9 out of 10 chance of heing true within the predlcted range:
The gli~bal warmlnp obser\~edover the past century is generally consistent with a posteriori model projections of expected greenhouse warming, if a reasonable sulfate particle offset is included. It is difficult, but not impossible, to construct conceivahle alternate hypotheses to explain this ohserved warming. Using variations in solar output or in natural climate to explain the observed warming can be appealing, but both have serious logical inconsistencies.
A doubling of atmospheric COz over preindustrial levels is projected to lead to an equilibrium glohal warming in the range of 1.5' to 4.5"C. These generous uncertainty brackets reflect remaining limitations in modeling the radiatix~efeedhacks of clouds, details of the changed amounts of water vapor in the upper troposphere (5 to 10 km), and responses of sea ice. I11 effect, this means that there is roughly a 10% chance that the actual equilibrium \varming caused by douhled atmospheric CO: levels coulcl be lon-er than l . 5 " C or higher than 4.j°C. For the anslver to lie outside these bounds, we n-ould have to discover a substantial surprise beyond our current understanding.
Essentially all clinlate moclels predict equilibrium glohal temperature increases that are nearly linear in the logarithm of CO:
changes. This effect is nlainly due to increasing saturation of Inany of the infrared ahsorption hands of CO?. That is, a quadrupling of COI levels generally produces projected warnings that are about ta.ice as larqe as those for doubled C0:. hlodels predict that hy the year 2100, global mean surface temperature changes under these t n .~ ~dealized scenarios \vould he 1.5" to 5°C.
Sea le~.el rise could he suhstantlal. The projections of 50 _+ 25 c~n by the year 21110, caused mainly by the thermal expansion of sea water, are helow the eq~ulibrium sea level rise that n.ould ultimately be expected. After 520 years at q~~adrupled C0:levels, the sea level rise expected due to thernlal expansion alone 1s roughly 2 i 1 111. Long-term melting of lanLllocked ice carries the potential for collsiderably higher values hut with less certainty. As the climate warms, the rate of evaporation must increase, leading to an increase in glohal mean precipitation of about 2 i O.i?b per 1"Cot global warming.
Bv 2C5C or so, the higher latitudes of the Korthem Henlisphere are also expected to experience temperature increases xell in excess of the glohal average increase. In addition, suhstant~al reductions of northerll sea Ice are expected. Precipltation is expected to increase significantly In 111gher northern latltudes. T h~s effect ~nailllv occurs hecause of the higher moisture concent of the nvarmer air as it moves pole~varil, cools, and releases its moisture.
Probable Projections
The follo\ving have a greater than tlvo out of three chance of being true: Model s t~~d i e s project eventual marked decreases in sol1 ~noisture 111 response to increases In surnnler tenlperatures over northern m1~1-latitude cont~nents. T h~s result remains somewhat senslti7.e to the deta~ls of predicted sprlng and summer precipitation, as well as to rnodel assumptions ahout land surface processes and the offsetting effects of airborne sulfate part~cles 111those regions. 1 Climate models imply that the circumAntarctic ocean region is substant~ally resistant to n-arming, anL1 thus little change in sea-ice cover is predicted to occur there, at least 07-er the next century or two.
The projected precipitation Increases at higher latitudes act to reduce the ocean's salinit\-and thus its densitv. This effect inhibits ;he tendency of the n'ater to sink, thus suppressing the overturning circulation.
\rer!-recent research (7) suggests that tropical storms, once formed, might tend to become more intense in the warmer ocean. at least in circumstances where weather and geographical (for example, no landfall) conditions permit. E ivloiiel studies project that the standard deviations of the natural temnerature fluctuations of the climate system would not change sign~ficantly. This indicates a n increased probability of n-arm n-eather e~. e n t s and a decreased probability of cold events, simply because of the higher mean temperature.
Incorrect Projections and Policy Implications
There are a number of statenlents in informal writings that are not supported by climate science or projections w~t h high-qualit\-climate models. Some of these statements may appear to be physically plausible, hut the evidence for their validity is weak, and some are just Lvrong.
There are assertions that the number of tropical storms, hurricanes, and t\-phoons per year will increase. That is possible, but there appears to be no credihle evidence to substantiate such assertions.
Assertions that winds in midlatitude (versus tropical) cyclones will hecome more Intense do not appear to have credihle scientific support. It is theoretically plausible that smaller-scale stornls such as thunderstorms or s q~~a l l lines could hecome stronger under locally favorable conditions, hut the direct evldeilce senlains n-eak.
There is a large denland for speciflc c11-Inate change predictions at the regional and local scales n-here llfe and llfe support systems are actuall\-affected. Unfortunately, our contidence in predictions o n these smaller scales will likely remain relatively low. Much greater fidelity of calculated local clinlate impacts will require large improx7e-merits in computational power and in the physical and biological soph~sticatioll of the models. For example, the large uncertainty in nodel line -the all-irnnortant resnonses of clouds could become even harder at regional and local le~.els. ivlajor sustained efforts w~l l be required to reduce these uncertainties substantially.
Characterizations of the state of the sclence of greenhouse x'i-arlning are often warped in differing ways hy people or groups w t h videly varying soc~opolltical agendas and hiases. This is unfortunate hecause such distortions grossly exaggerate the public's sense of controversy ahout the x~alue of the scientific knowledge hase as guidance for the policy deliheration process.
It is clear that ~n u c h is known ahout the climate system and ahout h i~w that knowledge is expressed through the use of physically based coupled models of the atmosphere, ocean, ice, and land surface systems. This knowledge makes it obvious that human-caused greenhouse warming is not a problem that can rationally be dismissed or ignored. However, the renlaining uncertainties in modeling important aspects of the nroblern make it ex~ident that we cannot yet produce a sharp picture of how the warmed climate will proceed, either globally or locally.
None of these recognized uncertainties can make the prohlem go away. It is virtually certain that human-caused greenhouse warming is going to continue to unfold, slowly but inexorably, for a long time into the future. T h e sex~erity of the impacts can he modest or large, depending o n ho\v s a n e of the remaining key uncertainties are resol~.ed through the eventual changes in the real clinlate system, and o n our success in reducing emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases. 
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